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PHILIP M. BERKOWITZ, JOHN H. MCCREERY, HOLLY M. ROBBINS, DAVID LARSON,
AND ANGELA R. BROUGHTON*
The regulation of employment discrimination in the multinational and multiethnic mar-
ketplace must dominate any discussion of recent developments in the field of international
employment law. In 1999, U.S. employment law decisions involving foreign parties contin-
ued to demonstrate that U.S. employment regulations, including prohibitions against ha-
rassment and discrimination, have become significant international compliance issues for
the growing number of corporations, based here and abroad, that participate in the global
economy. Part I of this report examines sexual harassment as a compliance issue forJapanese
corporations in the wake of a multimillion-dollar verdict against Mazda North America.
Part II examines recent decisions about the extraterritorial reach of U.S. employment law.
Discrimination issues also continue to affect political and economic systems in Europe.
Part m of this report provides an update on the European Union's reaction to discrimi-
nation against the Roma, particularly in Hungary. There also have been substantial amend-
ments to the Hungarian Labor Code.
I. Compliance With United States Sexual Harassment Laws
in the Wake of Arango v. Mazda North America
A. THE STANDARDS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Background
United States and foreign companies alike have often complained that the law of sexual
harassment in the United States is confusing and difficult to follow. The real difficulty lies
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not with understanding the law but in adapting to the very different and diverse cultures
found in the United States. This paper discusses the U.S. law of sexual harassment and
analyzes a recent jury verdict brought against a major Japanese employer, in the hope of
providing guidance to foreign companies doing business in the United States.
2. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Courts recognize two distinct categories of impermissible sexual harassment.' The first,
called quid pro quo sexual harassment, consists of conditioning an employment benefit on
the acceptance of sexual advances or sexual behavior. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when
an employer, through a supervisor or manager, alters an employee's job conditions or with-
holds an economic benefit, or threatens to do so, because the employee refuses to submit
to a sexual demand.2 Thus, quid pro quo sexual harassment is inherently coercive. Tradi-
tionally, employers have been held strictly liable for any quid pro quo harassment perpe-
trated by an employee.
The second type of sexual harassment, called "hostile environment" sexual harassment,
consists of subjecting an employee to sex-based harassment that is so severe or pervasive
that it alters the conditions of the victim's employment and creates an abusive working
environment.4 Hostile environment sexual harassment is more difficult to define than quid
pro quo harassment, and it can be hard to determine where the line is drawn between
behavior that constitutes sexual harassment and behavior that is merely offensive or in poor
taste.'
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court provided guidance on the issue of what constitutes a
hostile environment. In the decision of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,6 the Court enunciated
a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered, including: (1) the frequency of the conduct;
(2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or hu-
miliating, or merely an offensive utterance; (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance; and (5) the psychological harm, if any, caused by
the conduct.7 Even if the above factors are found to support a charge of hostile environment
1. The terms can be traced to Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) where the Court
"assumed, and with adequate reason, that if an employer demanded sexual favors from an employee in return
for a job benefit, discrimination with respect to terms or conditions of employment was explicit." Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1996).
3. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
4. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (plaintiff claimed that the conductof Forklift's
president constituted an abusive work environment).
5. "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's
purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has
not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation. But Title
V1I comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown ... Certainly Title VII bars
conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited
to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or
abusive, there is no need for it to be psychologically injurious." Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23.
6. See id. at 17.
7. See id. at 23 (stating that the determination can only be made after looking at the totality of the circum-
stances including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.").
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sexual harassment, however, employers are not automatically held strictly liable for that
harassment unless they knew, or should have known, about the hostile environment, or
unless certain other factors justified imputing the conduct to the employer.
3. The Supreme Court's 1998 Decisions
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court issued rulings in the companion cases of Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerths and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.9 These decisions clarified the
circumstances under which a company will be held liable for sexual harassment perpetrated
by its employees, and also provided employers with a procedure to avoid such liability in
some circumstances. Under the Ellerth and Faragher formulation, it is now clear that em-
ployers are liable for any sexual harassment that results in a tangible adverse employment
action against the victim, such as termination, demotion, or a reduction in compensation.' 0
The employer's liability in cases where such an adverse employment action occurs is strictly
imposed, meaning that the employer cannot avoid liability even if it shows that it did not
know the harassment was occurring or if it took swift corrective action when it learned of
the harassment.
In cases where no tangible adverse employment action has occurred, employers are still
liable for sexual harassment of an employee if the harassment was perpetrated by any su-
pervisor with immediate authority over the victim, or with successively higher authority."
However, the Supreme Court articulated a defense that is available to employers in this
second category of cases, where no adverse employment action has been taken against
the plaintiff.I" The employer can escape liability in such cases if it can demonstrate both
that: (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment and to promptly correct
any sexual harassment that did occur; and (2) the target of the harassment unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the preventive and/or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer. 3
4. Beyond Ellerth and Faragher-The New Rules of Compliance
In the wake of the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, the traditional distinction between quid
pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment is still utilized to
determine whether the plaintiff has, in fact, been a victim of sexual harassment. However,
in the subsequent determination of whether the employer bears liability for any such ha-
rassment, the focus has now been shifted to whether a tangible adverse employment action
has been taken against the plaintiff. If so, the inquiry ends and the employer will be held
liable. If not, the court will consider whether the harasser had immediate authority or
8. Burlington Indus. Inc., 524 U.S. at 742.
9. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
10. The Court framed the liability in terms of agency principles to determine liability on the part of em-
ployers. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742-67.
11. "An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environ-
ment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 745.
12. "[When no tangible employment action is taken, [a defending] employer may raise an affirmative defense
to liability, or damages .... Id.
13. "(a) [Tihat the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexuallyharassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or cor-
rective opportunities provided by the employer to avoid harm otherwise." Id.
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successively higher authority over the victim and whether the affirmative defense is available
to the employer.
However, the Ellerth and Faragher decisions by no means close the book on the issue of
when employers are liable for sexual harassment.14 The application of the EllerthiFaragher
affirmative defense has already spawned intense litigation. To give just one example, in the
case of Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue,'5 a federal court in New York decided that the affirmative
defense was available to the defendant employer even though the plaintiff had been fired,
because the termination resulted from an unrelated breach of policy by the employee and
was not a product of the purported harassment. The court also held that an employee would
be responsible for "unreasonably" failing to use the employer's harassment complaint pro-
cedure where the employee's reason for failing to do so was a general fear of conflict with
the employer.16
Recently, in Kolstad v. American Dental Association, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
employer will not be held liable for punitive damages if the alleged discriminatory conduct
of the employee runs contrary to the employer's established policies and good faith efforts
to comply with the law.7 This is another reason why every employer, both foreign and
domestic, should enunciate clear policies prohibiting sexual harassment, should promptly
investigate and address any complaints of sexual harassment, and should take all other steps
to demonstrate a real commitment to creating a harassment-free workplace and to otherwise
avoid actions that might make it vulnerable to punitive damages. Such policies should be
distributed to all employees, so that there can be no question that any employee who later
claims to have been harassed was aware of the policy and the appropriate complaint
procedure.
Moreover, any complaints of sexual harassment that are made must be treated seriously
and promptly investigated. Where such an investigation reveals that harassment has indeed
occurred, swift and effective remedial action must be taken. Employees should be encour-
aged to bring any sexual harassment or other discriminatory conduct to the attention of
management and should be assured that the company will never retaliate against an em-
ployee for making a sexual harassment complaint. Additionally, employers should consider
holding anti-sexual harassment training seminars for management or for all employees.
B. ARANGO V. MAZDA'"
1. The Facts
On February 17, 1999, a federal jury in Miami, Florida ordered Mazda North America
Inc. to pay more than $4.4 million to a former employee, Gabriella Arango, for damages
arising out of a sexual harassment claim. Of this amount, $111,000 was awarded for specific
14. Id. Gustices Thomas and Scalia dissenting) (explaining that the standards set forth by the Court are far
too vague and fail to explain how employers can rely upon the affirmative defense set forth by the majority).
15. Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
16. Id. at 491.
17. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2121 (1999) ("[We] agre[e] that, in the punitive
damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of
managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good faith efforts to comply with Title
VII' " (citing 109 F.3d 958, at 974 (TatelJ., dissenting)).
18. Arango v. Mazda N.A., Inc., No. 96-2750 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 1999).
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items such as lost wages. The remaining $4.3 million consisted of a punitive damages award
intended to punish Mazda. Ms. Arango claimed that she had been sexually harassed before
her discharge from the company's Miami office. Mazda chose to fight the claim and forced
a trial on the issue of whether Ms. Arango's new boss, Masaki Nakashima, had harassed
Ms. Arango and fired her when she resisted his sexual propositions.
The origins of the dispute lay in early 1995, when Mazda reassigned Mr. Nakashima
from its headquarters in Japan to assume control over its six-person office in Miami. There,
Ms. Arango was assigned to help Mr. Nakashima, a Japanese national, acclimate both pro-
fessionally and personally to his new position. Ms. Arango, who had performed similar
functions for several other Japanese nationals who had formerly been assigned to the Miami
office, did not object to the assignment.
Initially, there were no apparent problems between Mr. Nakashima and Ms. Arango. In
fact, soon after assuming control of the office, Mr. Nakashima promoted Ms. Arango not
only once, but twice, into positions granting her progressively more discretion. Their re-
lationship soon began to deteriorate, however, and Ms. Arango would later relate that Mr.
Nakashima had begun to harass her in what she understood to be a sexual fashion. She
claimed that on various occasions he informed her that if she obeyed him, she could have
anything she wanted, and that he told her that professional women such as herself "are very
good in the bedroom and the kitchen." In fact, Ms. Arango helped Mr. Nakashima select
bedding for his apartment, and he said that she should also help "decorate his bed." Ms.
Arango further claimed that Mr. Nakashima frequently touched her at the office, referred
to her as his girlfriend, asked her to "skebe" (a Japanese term that Mr. Nakashima said
referred to pornographic sex), and once, in a fit of possessive rage, struck her with a tele-
phone when she would not tell him with whom she was speaking.
Notwithstanding these allegations, Mazda seemed to have entered the suit confident that,
as an organization, it had acted properly in response to the situation. Mazda believed it had
learned lessons from the errors of companies previously sued for sexual harassment and had
tailored its behavior to avoid the mistakes made by these other entities. Thus, according to
Mazda, the company had provided preparatory training to its employees in U.S. sexual
harassment law before they were assigned to U.S. offices. In addition, Mazda asserted that
it had created a clearly articulated sexual harassment policy, and that once problems
emerged between Ms. Arango and Mr. Nakashima, the company promptly investigated on
three separate occasions. Despite these apparent efforts to comply with the law, however,
a federal jury slapped Mazda with the $4.4 million verdict. Thus, the question remains,
what did Mazda do wrong?
2. The Trial
Part of the explanation for the verdict may lie in the progress of the trial. Ms. Arango's
attorney, Beth Gordon, contested almost every one of Mazda's claims of compliance with
the law. She disputed the existence of an overseas training program; claimed that whatever
the sexual harassment policy might be at Mazda, it was not common knowledge because
employee handbooks were not distributed as a matter of course; and called the three in-
vestigations Mazda undertook a sham. According to Ms. Gordon, the first of these inves-
tigations was initiated by Ms. Arango (a point disputed by Mazda, which claimed that Mr.
Nakashima asked for the investigation and was advised afterwards to "crack the whip").
However, instead of sending a human resources manager to investigate the problem, Ms.
Gordon argued that the first Mazda official sent to Miami was in fact a risk manager assigned
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to minimize the company's exposure, rather than to investigate the merit of the sexual
harassment claims. In addition, Ms. Gordon argued that the results of the third investigation
were predetermined and that this "investigation" constituted nothing more than a glorified
firing, as the human resources manager traveled to Miami with three checks made out to
Ms. Arango already in hand.
Ms. Gordon argued that Mazda North America had relatively little control over Mr.
Nakashima, and that he could not be fired except by Mazda's home offices in Japan. In
addition, it appeared that Ms. Arango was fired as the result of a memorandum sent by Mr.
Nakashima to Mazda North America's offices in Detroit, and part of Ms. Arango's claim
for emotional pain and suffering stemmed from what Ms. Gordon termed the "public and
humiliating" manner in which Ms. Arango was eventually fired.
Many of Mazda's problems in the case may have come down to credibility. Ms. Arango
had been Mazda's highest-rated employee before Mr. Nakashima arrived in 1995. Expe-
rienced and capable of communicating in five languages, she had acted as a host without
incident for several Japanese nationals previously assigned to the Miami office. Mr. Na-
kashima, on the other hand, had to overcome both a language barrier at the trial (he testified
through an interpreter) and several damaging admissions (such as admitting to using the
word "skebe" with Ms. Arango). In addition, according to Ms. Gordon, Mazda faced sus-
picion that it was protecting and favoring its Japanese national employees, a problem made
more acute by the fact that it apparently had a policy of assigning only Japanese nationals
as supervisors.19
3. Cases Against Foreign Corporations Preceding Mazda
Arango v. Mazda was not the first high-profile sexual harassment case to involve a U.S.
subsidiary of a major foreign corporation. Prior to Mazda, such foreign giants as Mitsubishi
Motors and Astra Pharmaceuticals USA (a Swedish multinational) had experienced high-
profile sexual harassment cases. However, while Mitsubishi Motors and Astra may share
some similarities to Mazda in that they are large foreign companies that have struggled to
comply with U.S. sexual harassment standards, the facts of the cases against both those
companies were distinguishable from those involving Mazda.
In Mitsubishi Motors' highly publicized 1996 case, workers at the company's 4,000-
person assembly plant in Normal, Illinois were alleged to have engaged in chronically
sexually abusive behavior over a period of years. To make matters worse for Mitsubishi
Motors, the abuse was so pervasive that managers must have been aware of it yet took no
steps to address the situation. Indeed, some fifteen women claimed that they had been
groped and demeaned, with hundreds more claiming that they had suffered abuse and
humiliation and that their complaints to management had fallen upon deaf ears. Thus,
although the alleged lack of responsiveness by the company's managers was critical, the
case remains one revolving primarily around the conduct of co-workers in a workplace
sexually demeaning toward women.
Perhaps the most surprising element of the Mitsubishi Motors case, however, was the
approach that the company initially took in addressing the allegations. Rather than an-
nounce reforms or express regret, the company at first struck a defiant pose, on one occasion
19. It should be noted that several motions made by Mazda for a new trial and/or summary judgment as a
matter of law are still pending in this case. Mazda has based these motions upon Arango's alleged failure to
prove all of the elements of her claim and upon the alleged bias of the jury.
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sending a group of its employees to picket the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC). Not surprisingly, this tactic only brought more publicity to the case. Soon
thereafter, the company hired a new team of attorneys and a former U.S. Department of
Labor Secretary to conduct an audit of its employment practices and recommend new
procedures. In June 1997, Mitsubishi Motors settled with the EEOC for a record $34
million.
Astra is another U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation which found itself immersed in
a highly publicized sexual harassment case in 1996. For Astra, the apparent problems went
all the way to the top of its American subsidiary, as charges of sexual harassment were
leveled against the CEO of Astra, Lars Bildman, and other top officials. Astra's difficulties,
which were the subject of a front-page article in Business Week magazine, involved allegations
of a corporate environment in which high-ranking male officials allegedly fondled and
solicited sexual favors from female employees. Astra sought to deal with complaints from
women by negotiating individual settlements with each of them and including within the
settlements agreements that prevented the employee from discussing the circumstances of
the settlement or aiding others in similar suits against Astra. While Astra did have an official
policy against sexual harassment, complainants alleged that the policy was "meaningless"
and that employees who complained were subject to intimidation and harassment, possibly
from the CEO himself. Faced with a barrage of potentially devastating lawsuits, Astra was
forced to reach a settlement with the EEOC providing for the creation of a $9.5 million
claim fund, as well as a variety of agreements as to the company's future conduct.
C. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES AGAINST U.S. COMPANIES
Big-money sexual harassment suits have not been limited to the U.S. operations of for-
eign corporations. In 1995, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. was hit with a $50 million punitive
damages award by a federal jury in Missouri, in a case where the award for the plaintiff's
actual damages was only $35,000.20 The plaintiff in that case claimed that her direct su-
pervisor engaged in a pattern of verbal and physical sexual conduct and that Wal-Mart
failed to take effective action in response to her complaint. Although the judge ultimately
reduced the punitive damages award to $5 million, the message the case sent was clear. The
jury felt that Wal-Mart had ignored obvious indications that sexual harassment was occur-
ring in its workplace.
Even prominent law firms have not proven immune to major sexual harassment suits. In
1993, the world's largest law firm, Baker & McKenzie (Baker), was slapped with a
$6,950,000 punitive damages verdict by a jury determined to show that "even attorneys
aren't above the law."'2I In Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, the plaintiff alleged that her super-
visor, a prominent patent attorney, engaged in a variety of physically and verbally harassing
behaviors, including fondling her breasts, grabbing her buttocks, lunging at her with his
hands cupped as if to grab her breasts, and pulling her arms backward while offering to
"see which breast is bigger."22
20. See Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Inc., 907 F. Supp 1309 (1995).
21. Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 943043 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1994). The judge in this case
eventually reduced the punitive damages award to $3.5 million.
22. Id.
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But it was not merely the offensive nature of that conduct that incensed the jury into
awarding a multimillion-dollar verdict; far more problematic for Baker was the fact that
this was not the first time that harassment claims had been brought against the involved
partner. In fact, Ms. Weeks was the seventh woman to complain about his behavior. It was
this recidivism, and Baker's apparent willingness to tolerate such behavior from a partner
in the firm, that set the stage for the jury's punitive damages award. As juror LauranJohnson
said, "[T]here wasn't any doubt in anyone's mind that Baker & McKenzie knew this guy
was a problem and didn't do anything about it.""
Baker adopted a strategy at the trial of attempting to justify its actions in permitting the
partner to persist in his harassing behavior. Thus, despite the numerous complaints against
him, the firm insisted that it had handled the situation correctly. Furthermore, it called a
string of its own attorneys to the witness stand in an effort to convince jurors that Baker
had complied with the law. The jurors were not persuaded and concluded that the lawyers
were "talking lawyerese" in an effort to deceive the jury.24 This lack of credibility proved
especially damaging to Baker at the punitive damages stage of the trial when jurors appeared
unwilling to accept Baker's belated expressions of remorse. As juror Jeffrey Van Dyke said,
"[iut's hard to believe someone is a convert when they just spent five weeks lying to you
about it."25
D. ADVICE FOR JAPANESE EMPLOYERS IN PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
1. Implement a Zero-Tolerance Sexual Harassment Policy
The institution of a sexual harassment policy in an American workplace is mandatory.
Courts will look to the employer's sexual harassment policy in their determination of
whether the company promoted or discouraged a harassing environment. Moreover, states
such as California require employers to distribute written discrimination policies.' A sexual
harassment policy should be implemented alongside a general policy against all forms of
harassment. This policy must be distributed to all employees, for failure to do so may subject
the employer to liability for harassment even if the employer maintains a comprehensive
sexual harassment policy."
2. Establish an Internal Complaint Procedure
Every Japanese subsidiary or branch office should implement an internal procedure by
which the firm's Human Resources Department will respond quickly and efficiently to
complaints of sexual harassment or other forms of discrimination. Failure to respond or
conduct investigations may discourage employees from making complaints if they reason-
ably believe the employer will not address their concerns. Human Resources should conduct
a thorough investigation to determine whether any discrimination occurred and, if neces-




26. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 12950 (West 1994).
27. See Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1305 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (company had a policy in place, but
could provide no evidence that the three employees in the Montgomery office, where the conduct occurred,
had ever received the policy).
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kept confidential to the extent possible, subject to the employer's need to conduct a full
and fair investigation. The management officials who are involved in this process should
be made up of both Japanese and American nationals. The complaint procedure, as well as
the discrimination policy, should be posted on company bulletin boards and distributed in
the company's employee handbook.
3. Document All Job Actions
Supervisors should be required to document all important job-related actions. These
records may be of great value in case any dispute arises. For example, documentary evidence
may be able to support an employer's defense to a sexual harassment charge that the vic-
timized employee failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
offered by the employer.28
Written records should be maintained in confidence to the extent practicable and appro-
priate. Only a limited number of Human Resources and upper-management personnel
should be allowed access to employee personal files and records of harassment complaints.
4. Acclimate Japanese Managers to U.S. Discrimination Laws
Outside or in-house counsel with a solid understanding of Japanese and United States
cultures and business practices should provide an educational program to acquaintJapanese
managers (as well as all employees) with American anti-discrimination laws.9 This program
should cover both theoretical aspects of the laws and case studies based on suits against
Japanese or other multinational firms in the United States. The employer should also pro-
vide seminars for both Japanese and American employees designed to enhance cross-cultural
understanding and develop interpersonal skills.
5. Provide Well-Defined Job Descriptions
The company should provide a well-defined job description for each position. The de-
scriptions should contain job duties, requisite skills, knowledge, education, and experience.
Not only will publishing these descriptions assist employers by demonstrating that the
employer uses objective criteria in hiring decisions, but dissemination of these descriptions
may also reduce workplace tension by informing employees about the company's expec-
tations of them and by defining territorial boundaries.
6. Facilitate Communication Between Management and Employees
Japanese nationals serving in management positions in American subsidiaries or branches
of the home corporation should be encouraged to give honest evaluations of their employ-
ees' talents. All companies should institute performance appraisals and Japanese manage-
ment should straightforwardly communicate the results of these appraisals to their em-
ployees. Lack of direct communication, or appraisals only through informal discussions,
lead to misunderstandings on the part of American subordinate employees.
7. Encourage Acceptance of Japanese Culture by American Employees
U.S. citizens employed by Japanese companies should be encouraged and supported
in their efforts to learn Japanese language, social customs, and business practices. The
28. See Fierro, 13 F. Supp. 2d 481; Kendrick v. Country Club Hills Bd. of Educ., 1998 WL 440891 (N.D.
I1. 1998).
29. See Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, In the World, But Not of It: Japanese Companies Exploiting the U.S. Civil Rights
Law, 24 DENv. J. INT'L. L. & PoL'Y 169, 214 (1995).
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Japanese employer may also want to consider rotating American employees to Japan (as
opposed to only rotatingJapanese nationals in managerial positions) as a means of increasing
contacts and respect among Japanese and American employees, as well as countering any
impression of ethnic bias towards native-born Japanese.30
8. Communicate in English
All personnel policies, company memoranda, and bulletin board notices should be in
English in order to ensure that there is no bias against American employees. Managers in
American subsidiaries or branch offices who do not speak Japanese will feel excluded from
decision-making if Japanese managers speak only Japanese to each other when discussing
company policy.
E. CONCLUSION
In some ways, Arango v. Mazda is a puzzling case. Unlike Mitsubishi Motors and Astra,
Mazda appears on the surface to have complied with many of the basic guidelines established
by the courts in sexual harassment cases. Mazda claimed to have conducted a sexual ha-
rassment training program for its Japanese executives before they arrived in the United
States, to have created an explicit anti-sexual harassment policy, and to have promptly
investigated Ms. Arango's claims. However, it may be the things Mazda did not do that
doomed it to failure. Because Mazda chose to fight the battle at trial on two fronts-by
attempting to simultaneously prove both that there was no sexual harassment and that its
response was adequate and appropriate-Mazda did not express remorse that its sexual
harassment policy had failed. However, in case after case, it appears that an expression of
remorse is exactly what juries are looking for, and this single factor may do much to mitigate
the large punitive damages awards that can characterize sexual harassment cases.
Perhaps the most important lesson of the Mazda case is that, even with the benefit of the
guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Ellerth and Faragher, employer liability for
alleged sexual harassment remains a complex area that can be affected by a multitude of
factors in the workplace and at trial. This already complex milieu can become even more
complicated when the element of cross-cultural interaction among employees in a multi-
national organization is added to the mix. Employers should be sensitive to this situation
and to the importance of implementing effective anti-sexual harassment policies and pro-
cedures before problems arise.
H. The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Employment
Discrimination Laws
In 1991, the Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,31 held that Title VII
did not apply extraterritorially to U.S. businesses that employed U.S. citizens abroad. How-
ever, Congress quickly clarified its intention to the contrary. In enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Congress expanded the definition of "employee" to include U.S. citizens work-
ing for U.S. companies abroad. In 1999, several courts addressed the jurisdictional require-
30. See Michael Starr, Who's the Boss? The Globalization of U.S. Employment Law, 51 Bus. L. 635, 652 (1996).
31. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
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ments of Title VII, which govern when a person working outside of the United States is
protected by Title VII.
A. WHICH EMPLOYEES ARE COVERED BY TITLE VII?
As a result of the amendment, under Tide VII, "[w]ith respect to employment in a foreign
country, such term [employee] includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States."32
Title VII also states that it does "not apply to an employer with respect to the employment
of aliens outside any State ...."I Despite these seemingly unequivocal statements, several
non- U.S. citizens tested the bounds of the definition of "employee" in 1999. The courts
confirmed that Title VII does not apply to non-U.S. citizens working for U.S. companies
abroad, regardless of whether they were recruited or hired in the United States.
For example, in Hu v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,34 a Chinese citizen who was
a graduate of a U.S. law school applied for a position either as a first year associate in a
U.S. law firm's New York office or performing due diligence work in the firm's Beijing and
Hong Kong offices. He was not hired for either position and sued the law firm for age
discrimination. Insofar as his claim addressed the failure to hire him for the New York job,
the court granted summary judgment in favor of the law firm because he was not as qualified
for the job as the younger candidates the firm hired for the position."
The court dismissed his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on his claim that
he was not hired for the position abroad because of age discrimination. The plaintiff had
applied for U.S. citizenship but was a Chinese citizen at the time of the alleged discrimi-
nation. Tide VII does not apply to non-U.S. citizens who perform their work outside of
the United States. The facts that (1) the plaintiff conducted his job search in the United
States, (2) the firm conducted interviews in the United States, and (3) the firm may have
made hiring decisions in the United States did not place the employment within the United
States. The location of the work site is the key factor, and the plaintiff's work site would
have been in Beijing and Hong Kong. Thus, even though all of the actions taken with
respect to the plaintiff occurred in the United States, the plaintiff, a non-U.S. citizen, still
was not protected by Title VII.36
Similarly, in Iwata v. Stryker Corp.," the court dismissed the plaintiff's case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, a Japanese citizen, was the chairman and president
of Matsumoto, a Japanese subsidiary of Stryker, an American parent company. Matsumoto
hired the plaintiff when he was living in the United States as a resident alien but required
him to relocate to Japan. Although the plaintiff made several work-related trips to the
United States, he lived in Japan while working for Matsumoto. Matsumoto discharged the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff moved back to the United States and filed a lawsuit claiming race,
national origin, and age discrimination." Because the plaintiff was not a U.S. citizen and
was employed abroad, his claim was dismissed.3 9
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(O (1994).
33. Id. § 2000e-l(a).
34. Hu v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 76 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
35. See id. at 477.
36. See id.
37. Iwata v. Stryker Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
38. The court noted that the ADEA provisions regarding employees employed abroad and employers subject
to Title VII are virtually identical to those in Title VII and that the same analysis applied. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C.
§§ 630(o and 623(h) (1999)).
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These cases make clear that, regardless of how long a person has lived in the United
States and of the contacts they had with the United States in obtaining a job abroad, non-
U.S. employees who primarily work abroad are probably not protected by Title VII.
B. WHAT EMPLOYERS ARE COVERED By TITLE VII?
The question of whether a company is a U.S. employer subject to Title VII is a more
complicated question. When a foreign corporation is controlled by a U.S. employer, Title
VII applies to the foreign corporation's treatment of its U.S. citizen employees. The de-
termination of whether an employer "controls" a corporation is based on (1) the interre-
lation of operations, (2) the common management, (3) the centralized control of labor
relations, and (4) the common ownership or financial control.- Courts have been less will-
ing to dismiss cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the employer
is not covered by Title VII than on the grounds that the employee is not covered.
For example, in Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co.,41 the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen who
worked for Agip Petroleum Co. (Agip US), a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Texas, for several years. In 1993, the plaintiff signed an employment contract
with Agip to work at IEOC Co., a Panamanian corporation doing business in Egypt. In
1996, she signed another contract with Agip to relocate to England to work at Agip (UK)
Ltd. (Agip UK), a U.K. corporation of which Eni S.p.A., an Italian corporation, was the
majority shareholder. While working for Agip UK, the plaintiff filed employment discrim-
ination charges in Texas, claiming sexual harassment and retaliation, and subsequently filed
suit.
42
Agip US moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the plain-
tiff was not an employee of Agip US at the time she suffered the alleged discrimination,
and that Agip US controlled neither IEOC nor Agip UK. The plaintiff contended that
subject matter jurisdiction existed because there was evidence that, regardless of Agip's
control over IEOC and Agip UK, the plaintiff had an employee-employer relationship with
Agip US. 43
The court discussed its ability to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at length
and stated that, although the court, rather than the jury, may make determinations about
facts relating to subject matter jurisdiction, where factual findings about subject matter
jurisdiction are intertwined with the merits of a Tide VII case, the court would not dismiss
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless the plaintiff's claim were "insubstantial
and frivolous."- The court declined to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
in light of evidence proffered by the plaintiff of three employment contracts between her
and Agip US, her inclusion in Agip US's payroll, and other evidence suggesting Agip US's
exercise of control over her activities. 45
39. See id.; see also Iskandar v. American Univ. of Beirut, 1999 WL 595651 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing
plaintiff's claim under ADEA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff was a Lebanese citizen
working at the American University campus in Beirut, Lebanon).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(3).
41. Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 558 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
42. See id. at 564.
43. See id. at 565.
44. Id. at 573.
45. See id. at 565. This case presents an interesting contrast with Hu. The court seemed willing to entertain
the idea that the plaintiff, although she worked abroad, was actually an employee of Agip US, in the United
VOL. 34, NO. 2
BUSINESS REGULATION 465
Santerre does not provide any guidance on whether Agip US "controlled" the other
companies for the purposes of Title VII. However, in Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp.,46 the
court provided guidance in this area in a different context. In Meng, the court discussed
how to determine whether a parent corporation was liable for the actions of its subsidiary
under Title VII. To make this determination, the court examined the same four factors set
forth in Title VII for determining whether an employer "controls" a foreign corporation.
To determine whether sufficient interrelation of operation existed, the court considered:
(1) whether the parent was involved directly in the subsidiary's daily decisions regarding pro-
duction, distribution, marketing, and advertising; (2) whether the parent and the subsidiary
shared employees, services, records, and equipment; (3) whether the entities commingled bank
accounts, accounts receivable inventories, and credit lines; (4) whether the parent maintained
the subsidiary's books; (5) whether the parent issued the subsidiary's paychecks; and (6) whether
the parent prepared and filed the subsidiary's tax returns.47
To determine whether the parent controlled the subsidiary's labor relations, the court
considered:
whether the subsidiary has a separate human resources department, whether it establishes its
own personnel and makes its own decision as to the hiring, discipline, and termination of its
employees, whether personnel status reports are approved by the parent, whether the subsidiary
must clear all major employment decisions with the parents, and whether the parent routinely
shifts employees between the two companies.4
The factors discussed in Meng, although considered for a different purpose, may be helpful
to employers in assessing the risks associated with employment of U.S. citizens by their
subsidiaries abroad.
C. COUNTING EMPLOYEES
Title VII also may reach overseas to affect foreign companies that have even a few em-
ployees in the United States. Various provisions of U.S. civil rights laws center on the
number of employees a company employs. For example, for the ADEA to apply, the em-
ployer must have at least twenty employees.49 For Title VII to apply, the employer must
have at least fifteen employees10 Title VII also includes a punitive damages cap that varies
based on the number of persons employed by a company."' Such statutes, which require
counting how many employees work for a company, may have impact on multinational
companies that have a small office in the United States.
Last year, this updates2 discussed in detail the first appellate court decision dealing with
States. Even though the plaintiff in Hi had apparently never left the United States in applying for a job that
would take him abroad, the court did not consider whether the law firm in the United States had discriminated
against him.
46. Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). For further discussion of Meng, see
Philip M. Berkowitz, Employment Law Issues: Issues of Concern for Foreign-Owned Companies, 223 N.Y. L.J. 5
(2000).
47. Meng, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03.
48. Id. at 403.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1999).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
52. See Angela Broughton et al., International Employment, 33 Irr'L LAW. 291 (1999).
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the issue of "who counts."53 When a foreign business has a small office in the United States,
should only the employees in the U.S. office be counted or do employees worldwide count?
In Morelli v. Cedel, the Second Circuit determined that, for the purposes of the ADEA,
employees of foreign entities not controlled by domestic employers may be counted to
reach the minimum employee requirement.5 4 The court followed the same rationale in
Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, N. Y, holding that employees abroad may be included
in a head count done for the purposes of determining the punitive damages cap."
In 1999, the same analysis was used by at least one court outside of the Second Circuit
and was applied to the minimum employee requirement under Title VII. In Wildridge v.
IER, Inc., an employee of a U.S. branch of a foreign business sued her employer under Title
VII.56 Her employer claimed that it was not subject to Title VII because the U.S. branch
employed only fifteen people. The court found that employees of overseas operations of
foreign companies could be counted for the purposes of determining whether the company
had the minimum number of employees under Tide VII. The court found that the exemp-
tion for overseas operations of foreign companies went only to the substantive protections
of Title VII, not to doing a head count of employees.5" The reasons for the minimum
employment requirement, include "(1) the burdens of compliance and potential litigation
costs; (2) the protection of intimate and personal relations existing in small businesses;
(3) potential effects on competition and the economy; and (4) constitutionality concerns
under the Commerce Clause."58 Finding that these considerations were not implicated
when a multinational business had a small U.S. office, the court determined that employees
abroad could be counted toward the minimum-employee requirement."
These recent cases illustrate that foreign companies who have even a few employees in
the United States must be cognizant of U.S. civil rights laws. However, there is room for
disagreement with Morelli, Greenbaum, and Wildridge as these three cases appear to conflict
with the line of cases discussed in section A above, which stresses that an "employee" cannot
be a non-U.S. citizen abroad. Title VII states, "[T]he term 'employer' means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees .... 60 Be-
cause, with respect to employment in a foreign country, the definition of "employee" only
includes U.S. citizens, it would seem that non-U.S. citizens who are employed abroad
should not be included within the minimum-employee requirement. It will be interesting
to see whether other jurisdictions follow the Morelli interpretation of the minimum em-
ployee requirements of the civil rights statutes in the future.
m. Update on Roma Discrimination and Developments
in Hungary
This Committee's report for the 1998 year-in-review edition of The International Law-
yer 6 1 discussed discrimination directed against the Roma (or gypsies) in East Europe. Be-
53. See id. at 312-14.
54. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1998).
55. Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, N.Y., 26 F. Supp. 2d 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
56. Wildridge v. IER, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 429 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
57. See id. at 430.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 431.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
61. Broughton, 33 INr'L LAW. at 299.
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cause employment discrimination against the Roma is widespread, and because the political
criteria for European Union (EU) membership requires applicant countries to respect hu-
man rights and freedoms, it is important to continue to track applicant countries' reported
progress toward eliminating discrimination against the Roma.62
Unlike last year's discussion, however, which focused exclusively on the subject of Roma
discrimination and EU membership implications for the five applicant countries with the
largest Roma populations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia),
this discussion will focus primarily on Hungary. It will also briefly examine general labor
law developments in Hungary. Developments in Hungary warrant special attention because
Hungary likely will be one of the first, if not the first, of the current applicants to be
integrated into the EU. In addition, significant amendments to the Hungarian Labor Code
became effective in 1999.
A. ROMA DISCRIMINATION IN HUNGARY-EU MEMBERSHIP IMPLICATIONS
Numerous factors control whether applicant countries will be granted EU membership.
The EU's internal market assumes the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital. According to the Report on Progress-Hungary, the effective implementation of these
four freedoms requires compliance with important principles such as nondiscrimination.
In the Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of
the Candidate Countries: October 13, 1999,63 (Report on Progress-Candidate Countries)
the European Commission examined each applicant country's progress towards satisfying
"political criteria," "economic criteria," and "other obligations" for EU membership. 64
These requirements were established at the 1993 European Council meeting in ,Copen-
hagen, where the Council articulated the conditions for becoming a member of the EU. A
candidate country must demonstrate that it:
(1) has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
and respect for and protection of minorities (Political Criteria);
(2) has a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures
and market forces within the EU (Economic Criteria); and
(3) has the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims
of political, economic, and monetary obligations of the EU (Other Obligations). 6
The political criteria with which each applicant must comply include requirements con-
cerning human rights and the protection of minorities. The recent Report on Progress-
Hungary states that Hungary continues to respect human rights and already has acceded to
the most important human rights conventions. The Annex to the Report on Progress-Can-
didate Countries lists eighteen Human Rights Conventions and identifies which Conventions
had been ratified by each candidate country as of June 1999.66 The Human Rights Con-
62. See European Commission, European Commission Enlargement: Regular Report from the Commission on
Progress towards Accession, Hungay-October 13, 1999 (visited June 18, 2000) <http://europa.eu.int/comn/
enlargement/hungary/rep_10_- 99/aa.htm> [hereinafter Report on Progress-Hungary].
63. European Commission, European Commission Enlargement: Composite Paper Regular Report from the Com-
mission on Progress Towards Accession by each of the Candidate Countries, October 13, 1999 (last modified Oct. 13,
1999) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_lo_99/composite/31 .htn>.
64. Id.
65. See id. at Annex, available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report 10_99/intro/index.htm>.
66. Id. at Annex, available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reporte_1099/hr/conventions.htm>.
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ventions listed include, for example, the European Charter for Human Rights, the Euro-
pean Convention for the Prevention of Torture, the European Social Charter, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.67 Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia
had ratified sixteen of the eighteen Conventions by June 1999, more than the other ten
applicant countries.6 8 Thus, at first glance, Hungary appears to have made substantial, and
perhaps sufficient, progress regarding human rights and the protection of minorities.
Although the 1999 Report on Progress-Hungary states that the situation of "other mi-
norities" does not pose any particular problem, the human rights of the 400,000 to 600,000
Roma living in Hungary have not received adequate attention or protection. 69 Noting that
the Roma's situation has not deteriorated, the Report states there has not been a marked
improvement.76 The Report on Progress-Hungary explains that the Roma continue to suffer
widespread prejudice and discrimination in, among other areas, employment. Pervasive and
overt prejudice against the Roma has been reported by both international and nongovern-
mental organizations.7"
The Hungarian government is aware of ongoing employment discrimination against the
Roma. The Hungarian Ombudsman for Minorities Rights has declared that although there
is no dejure discrimination, there is defacto discrimination. The Ombudsman consequently
has proposed that labor centers should not only be required to record and report Roma
discrimination cases, but they also should be required to exclude employers who discrimi-
nate from public works contracts.7 2
There is some evidence, however, that conditions are improving for the Roma in Hungary.
The Government has adopted a revised medium-term action program to improve living
conditions for the Roma. The program, in particular, will attempt to improve education and
employment opportunities.73 Additionally, yearly action programs have been developed to
implement measures defined in the medium-term program. 4 Furthermore, as a result of local
minority self-government elections, the number of Roma self-governments has almost dou-
bled. Thus, there is evidence that Roma participation in public life is increasing. Roma Com-
munity Centers, financed by the State, have been established specifically to preserve Roma
culture and support local communities."
Nonetheless, the 1999 Report on Progress-Hungary concludes that the Roma situation is
still problematic. Strategies to overcome prejudices that exist within the majority of the
population, attempts to end discriminatory practices in public services, and full enforcement
of the revised medium-term action programs at regional and local levels demand increased
attention and adequate monetary support. 76
In its Report on Progress-Hungary, the European Commission prepared a General Eval-
uation section77 as part of the Political Criteria section. The General Evaluation, which is
67. See id.
68. See id. The other ten candidate countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lith-
uania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey.
69. Id., available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/hungary/rep-10_99/bl2.htm>.
70. Id.
71. Id. At least concerning police discrimination against the Roma , the government did establish a specific
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very succinct and includes only four sentences, highlights the most significant issues. In this
section, the European Commission states that although Hungary fulfills political criteria
for EU Accession, two areas require attention. The first concern requiring attention is the
Roma situation, which the European Commission asserts will require the government to
implement its medium-term Roma action program and provide sufficient monetary sup-
port.78 The second matter concerns the ongoing fight against corruption and need for
reinforced efforts to that end.79
The European Commission's concern with the Roma situation should not be underes-
timated. In the Report on Progress-Hungary, the Commission provides a detailed seventy-
page discussion of political criteria, economic criteria, ability to assume EU membership
obligations, and administrative capacity to apply the EU's core principles-all in an attempt
to determine Hungary's prospects for EU membership.
When it then begins the Conclusion section, what concern does it raise first? The Con-
clusion begins again by asserting that the Roma situation still requires attention. Last year's
article asked whether EU member states would reject new applicants based upon a failure
to eliminate, or at least reduce, discrimination against the Roma. Last year's article sug-
gested that if the member states find themselves struggling with internal issues, or becoming
increasingly concerned about integrating lesser-developed economies, the member states
could assert applicants' failure to successfully address Roma discrimination as a reason to
delay accession. It still seems unlikely, as it also did one year ago, that member states would
reject applicants based solely upon the failure to reduce discrimination against the Roma.
The continued emphasis, however, in the 1999 Commission's Report on Progress-Hungary
does suggest that the EU may be willing to use Roma discrimination at least as its articulated
reason for delaying acceptance into the Union.
B. AMENDMENTS TO THE HUNGARIAN LABOR CODE
On June 1, 1999, the Hungarian Parliament passed amendments to the Hungarian Labor
Code80 that became effective in August 1999.1l Because Hungary is one of the applicant
countries hoping to accede to the EU as quickly as possible, labor legislation must be
harmonized in order to facilitate EU membership. This brief discussion of the Hungarian
Labor Code will not attempt to summarize the entire code, or even try to explain the
significance of all the recent amendments (which, if done properly, would require an analysis
of the 1992 Labor Code). It will, however, identify a few noteworthy provisions in the
recent amendments.
Although efforts to harmonize Hungarian law generally receive popular support, the
recent amendments to the Hungarian Labor Code were not universally applauded. A
77. Id., available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/hungary/rep-10-99/bl3.htm>.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Act XXII of 1992 on the Labor Code.
81. See Amendment Act LVI of 1999 on the Amendment of Act XXII of 1992 on the Labor Code, Act
XXIII of 1992 on the Legal Status of Civil Servants, Act XXXIII of 1992 on the Legal Status of Public Servants,
Act LXVIII of 1997 on the Service Relationship of Law Enforcement Employees, Act LXXX of 1994 on the
Service Relationship of Public Prosecutors and on Data Management for the Purposes Public Prosecution, Act
LXVII of 1997 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act XLIII of 1996 on the Service Rela-
tionship of Professional Members of the Armed Forces.
82. Although surveys conducted by Szonda Ipsos conclude that Hungary has the strongest support for EU
accession among perspective members, this support apparently is declining. In 1989 to 1990, approximately
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spokesperson for Hungary's largest trade union confederation, the National Confederation
of Hungarian Trade Unions (NCHTU), declared in January 2000 that the unilateral mod-
ification of the Labor Code, among other legislative amendments, "prove[s] that the gov-
ernment is forcing decisions through Parliament against the will of employers and em-
ployees, with total disregard to their opinion. Not even with the best of intention can one
say that there is social dialogue complying with the European social model in Hungary
today."s" Although the NCHTU statement may have been prompted as much by a belief
that the trade unions had been excluded from the legislative process as by the substance of
the amendments, the claim does, nonetheless, raise questions about the recent amendments.
The NCHTU is not the only critic of the labor and employment environment in Hun-
gary. The European Commission's 1999 Report on Progress-Hungary, recognizing that
Hungarian labor legislation already is partially harmonized with EU legislation, nonetheless
asserts that no further progress was achieved during 1999 and that additional work must
be done to satisfy the remaining acquiss4 requirements. Specifically, Hungary must address
"collective redundancies, wage guarantee fund, posting of workers, safety and health at work
for temporary workers and European work councils.""s
Obviously, the 1999 Labor Code Amendments do not begin to address all of the Euro-
pean Commission's concerns, but the Amendments do make several significant changes.
Before identifying a few of the recent amendments, however, at least a few general words
should be said about the Labor Code.
The Hungarian Labor Code frequently provides significantly more protection for em-
ployees than that which exists in the United States.s6 For example, section 87 of the 1992
Hungarian Labor Code establishes that an employment relationship may be terminated by
mutual consent, by regular dismissal, or by extraordinary dismissal."' Section 88 explains
that an employment relationship established for a limited duration, in other words, a def-
inite term employment relationship, can be terminated by ordinary notice only if the em-
ployer pays the employee one year's average salary (if the remaining employment term is
less than one year, the employer still must pay the average salary for the remaining period)."s
If an employer wants to terminate an employment relationship of unlimited duration, then
not only must it provide notice that clearly indicates the reason for the dismissal, it must
prove the authenticity and substantiality of the reason (which must be related to the em-
ployee's ability, behavior that affects the employment relationship, or the employer's opera-
tions), 9 Generally, employees cannot be terminated while they are sick (for one year after
80% of Hungarians supported European Union membership. That support, however, declined to 65% in
January 1999 and fell further to 63% in September 1999. See Country Forecast Hungary, 4th Quarter 1999,
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNITED LIMITED, Dec. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 23934129.
83. ICFTU Letter to Orban-Hungarian Union Comment (Jan. 11, 2000), available at 2000 WL 7251885.
84. An abbreviation of the French term "Acquis Communautaire." The term means body of community law
and the acquis requirements are intended to create a single market.
85. European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towardsAccession Hungary-October
13, 1999, available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/hungary/rep-10 _99_b3 5.htm>.
86. Employees who do not terminate the employment relationship properly, however, can be required to
pay the employer his or her average salary for up to one and a half months. (This amount can be increased to
three months in a collective bargaining agreement and can be up to twelve times the average salary for higher
level employees.) See Act XXII of 1992 on the Labor Code (May 4, 1992), § 101.
87. Act XXII of 1992 on the Labor Code (4 May 1992), § 87.
88. Id. § 88.
89. See id. § 89.
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expiration of sick leave, or for the entire duration if caused by an industrial accident or
occupational disease), on leave caring for children or a close relative, while pregnant or for
three months after giving birth, or during military service. 90
The preceding paragraph illustrates, albeit briefly, the general nature and tone of the
Hungarian Labor Code. Employers must comply with specific procedures, provide clear
and acceptable reasons, and act within specific time limitations.
Did the 1999 amendments make any significant changes? Section 31 of the 1992 Labor
Code has been amended to allow works councils to sign collective bargaining agreements
with employers if a trade union does not exist at a particular workplace. 91 Because works
councils are mandatory at all workplaces with at least fifty employees, employees at those
workplaces who do not have union representation now may be covered by a collective
agreement.
Employers can invoke extraordinary dismissal procedures if an employee willfully, or by
gross negligence breaches the employment obligations, or if the employee engages in con-
duct that makes it impossible to continue the employment relationship. 2 The 1992 Code
required the employer to take action within six months after the wrongdoing. 93 The 1999
Amendments extend the time period within which an employer must act to one year, or up
to the statute of limitations if a crime is involved.-
Management employees who engage in conduct that warrants an extraordinary dismissal,
who generally can cause an employer much greater harm than lower level employees, now
can be held responsible for misconduct for a significantly longer time than lower level
employees. The 1999 Amendments state that the right of extraordinary dismissal can be
exercised against a management officer for three years after the misconduct. If the man-
agement employee commits a crime, extraordinary dismissal rights can be exercised so long
as the statute of limitations has not expired.9
While this short review certainly does not explain every change introduced by the 1999
Amendments to the Labor Code, it does alert the reader to the fact that the Hungarian
Labor Code has been amended and that the European Union will expect (require) Hungary
to introduce substantially more new labor legislation in the very near future.
90. See id. § 90, as amended by Amendment Act LVI of 1999.
91. Amendment Act LVI of 1999, § 2(2).
92. See id. § 96 (1)(a) and (b).
93. Id. § 96 (4).
94. Id. § 11.
95. See id. at Ch. X, Special Regulations Pertaining to Employees in Management Positions, (amending
§ 190 of Act XXII of 1992 on the Labor Code).
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